Fair Comment - A California Privilege Staff by Schaut, Donald B. & Lea, James G., Jr.
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 1 | Number 1 Article 8
1-1-1961
Fair Comment - A California Privilege Staff
Donald B. Schaut
James G. Lea Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Donald B. Schaut and James G. Lea Jr., Fair Comment - A California Privilege Staff, 1 Santa Clara Lawyer 32 (1961).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol1/iss1/8
FAIR COMMENT -- A CALIFORNIA PRIVILEGE.
Donald B. Schaut and James G. Lea, Jr.*
In 1921, the Supreme Court of California ruled that the defense
of fair comment extended to false statements of fact.1 Thus California is
said to follow the minority view.2 The traditional view is that the defense
of fair comment could never extend to a false assertion of fact. It is our
contention, based on other American cases in which this question was
raised3 and on general considerations of the law of libel, that whether a
court will follow the majority or minority position depends upon the court's
original analysis of the nature of the defense of fair comment. If the de-
fense of fair comment is a privilege, or an extension of the privilege to re-
port matters of public concern, it should extend to misstatements of fact;
while if it is a defense of the same nature as truth, the traditional limitations
of the doctrine are correct.
The defenses to an action for libel are of two general kinds. The first
is that of truth, in which the defendant alleges that speaking the truth is
not libel. The second is the defense of privilege in which the defendant con-
fesses the commission of a libel, but attempts to avoid liability because
society attaches importance to his right to speak or write on that occasion.
Since libel is generally defined as a false statement,
4 the defense of truth
may be called a defense in denial and justification since it denies the libelous
character of the statement or publication: the defense of privilege is, on the
other hand, a plea in confession and avoidance.
5 The traditional view is that
the defense of fair comment is a plea in justification and denial and not a
libel at all. As in the defense of truth, if the defendant did not meet the
exacting requirements of the plea, 6 he was held liable. But unlike the claim
of privilege there could be no mistake of fact within the defendant's state-
ment.7 Taking their cue from the criminal law tendency to relax the severity
of the penalty, the courts provided for an area of immunity within the defi-
nition of the tort itself. Comment fairly made on matters of public interest or
works submitted for public approval was not libelous. 8
A privilege was said to arise from a specific relationship by way of a
duty arising from the social importance attached to the situation out of which
the communication arose.0 Thus the notion of privilege was at odds with the
idea of fair comment in so far as it provided that all persons were free to
make the same statement. If all persons were able to speak without liability,
it was said technically not to be a privilege.1 °
As late as 1868 it was still open to question whether or not one could
report proceedings of parliament.1 1 It is interesting to note the decision in
. Second year law students, University of Santa Clara School of Law.
I. Snively v. Record Publishing Company, 185 Cal. 565, 198 Pac. 1 (1921).
2. Annot., lIIQ A.L.R. 412, 435 (1937).
3. Scripps v. Foster, 41 Mich. 742, 3 N.W. 216 (1879); Palmer v. City of Concord, 48 N.H.
211 (1868).
4. Cal. Ann. Civ. Code. §45 (West 1954).
5. Salmond. Torts (12th ed. 1957). p. 371.
6. Ruthford v. Paddock 180 Mass. 289, 62 N.E. 281 (1902).
7. Coffin v. Brown, 94 Md. 190, 50 Atl. 567 (1901).
8. Merry v. Guardian Printing and Publishing Company, 79 N.I.L. 74 Atd. 464 (1909).
9. Henwood v. Harrison, (1872) L.R. 7 C.P. 606.
10. Merivale v. Carson, 20 Q.B. 275, 280 (1887): "in the case of criticism ... every person
in the Kingdom is entitled to do and is forbidden to do exactly the same thing."
II. Wason v. Walter, (1868) L.R. 4 Q.B. 73.
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that case established a privilege common to all citizens and was based on
social importance rather than upon any specific relationship that the de-
fendant bore to the rest of the community. Therefore the traditional state-
ment that fair comment is not a privilege because it is not confined to a
particular relationship 12 is not sound on historical principles. It can be
seen from the nature of the many types of privileges, that a privilege exists
where reasons of social policy call for it and not necessarily where it is
limited to a few persons.13 The choice is whether one desires the conse-
quences of treating the defense in the same manner as other privileges, or
to make it an exception to the very concept of libel.
THE EXTENT 01 THE PRIVILEGE
The consequences of holding fair comment to be a privilege vary among
the many jurisdictions. If a particular jurisdiction follows the prevailing
American view that the plaintiff cannot recover unless he shows either
special damages or that the statement is defamatory on its face without ref-
erence to extrinsic facts, there would be no presumption of damages from a
privileged communication1 4 and special damages might have to be pleaded.'
Many courts confuse the distinction between libel on its face and slander
per se.1 6 In those states where the libel is a statement that would be slander
per se if spoken, it is possible to have an inference of malice from the fact
of the statement alone. For this reason, the defense of fair comment could
never be extended to a libel per se, 1 7 where the defense is not regarded as
one of privilege. In a privileged communication there is no possible infer-
ence of maliceils Moreover, as a practical matter, malice in a privileged
communication is much harder to show than the inferred or fictional malice.
California holds that malice in fact must be shown in a privileged writing.
19
Another variation of the same problem is presented in any jurisdiction
where the fiction is still retained that malice is necessary to state a cause of
action for libel.20 Here again there would no presumption of malice in a
privileged occasion.
Another presumption is that a libelous statement is false. Again the
presumption is not available in the face of a privilege. In fact it is not
essential that a privileged statement be true to avoid liability,
2 1 and this
notion lies at the heart of our contention.
Dean Prosser claims that it makes no difference whether the publication is
defamatory but privileged, or whether it is considered as merely outside
the scope of defamation simply because in either case there is immunity of
fair comment.2 2 He then treats separately the issues of whether misstate-
ment of fact can come within the doctrine and whether comment may be
made on the motive or personal character of a public figure. Yet he points
out here that a qualified privilege is lost solely by the malicious intent of the
12. Winfield, Torts (6th ed. 154), pp. 332, 333.
13. Veeder, Freedom of Public Discussion, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 413 (1910).
14. Hall, Pleading in Libel Actions in California, 12 So. Calif. L. Rev. 225, 248, 252 (1939).
15. O'Connell v. Press Publishing Company, 214 N.Y. 352, 108 N.E. 556 (1915).
16. Prosser, Law of Torts (2d ed. 1955) p. 588.
17. Foley v. Press Publishing Company, 226 App. Div. 535, 235 N.Y. Supp. 340 (1st Div.
1929).
18. Kellems v. California Congress of Industrial Organization Council, 68 F. Supp. 277
(1946); Cherry v. Des Moines Leader, 114 Iowa 298, 86 N.W. 323 (1901).
19. Locke v. Mitchell, 7 Cal. 2d 599, 69 P. 2d 878 (1937); Cal. Civ. Code §48a, 4(d).
20. Bromage v. Prosser, (1825) 4 B.&C. 247, 255.
21. Restatement, Torts §§ 600-602 (1938); Locke v. Mitchell, supra, note 19.
22. Prosser, Op. Cit., supra, note 16 at p. 619.
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puiblisher,2 3 and that a privilege is conditioned not on truth but on grouhds
of reasonable belief.24 If the alleged defamatory statement is held to be one
of fact, the publisher's intent would seem to be important if the defense is
one of privilege. If the argument is that malice makes the comment unfair
rather than that malice destroys the privilege, the result is that the same
statement either is or is not a tort, depending on the writer's intent. It makes
more sense to say that the statement is a defamation in both cases, but in
the case of privilege without malice, it is socially important that it should not
be actionable. Further, how then can one say that a reasonable mistake of
fact is still within the protection of privilege?25
The majority position is that fair comment does not extend to a comment
made as a statement of fact,26 but the distinction between fact and opinion
is one of the most elusive ever attempted by philosophers or lawyers.27
Courts following such a distinction have even held that "a statement of fact
can be a statement of opinion where it appears to be a deduction or con-
clusion derived by the writer from other facts."28 Other courts have taken
the position that the location of the statement, such as on the editorial
page,2 9 can determine if the statement is one of fact or opinion. To maintain
any logical consistency, it would seem that if the occasion is one of privilege,
it should not matter whether the statement was one of fact.30 Actually the
defense of privilege allows reasonable mistakes as to facts.3a
FAIR COMMENT AS A DENIAL
It is important to note that most courts following the majority position
that the defense is one of denial, hold statements about a man's motive to be
statements of fact as a matter of law.32 Yet the real question would seem
to be whether or not the statement is relevant to the public interest which
gave rise to the right to comment in the first place. It does not take much
imagination to envision situations where a man's personal character and
motive is of the utmost importance, especially in the political area.3 3 Any
iron-clad rule here would exclude much healthy comment and could seriously
limit freedom of expression. The question then is whether the particular
statement is within the scope of the privilege, i.e., whether it is of legitimate
public concern rather than whether it is a statement of fact.
A court is said to be liberal if it adopts the minority position and allows
the defense to extend to an assertion of fact without compelling the defendant
to prove the truth of the statement. But the distinction between liberal and
conservative is a result of the manner in which the court chooses to regard
the defense. 3 4 To maintain any predictability, once the court decides that
the defense is one of privilege, it implies that the defense will extend to as-
23. Id. at 627.
24. Id. at 628.
25. Ibid.
26. Noel. Defamation of Public Officers, 49 Columbia L. Rev. 875. 897 (1949).
27. Golden North Airways v. Tanana Publishing Company, 218 F. 2d 612, 630 (1955);(Note concurring opinion of Pope, C. J.).
2S. O'Brien v. Marquis of Salisbury, 54 J. P. 215 (1889).
29. Golden North Airways v. Tanana Publishing Company, supra, note 27.
30. Campbell v. Spottiswoode (1863) 3 B.&S. 769.
31. Barry v. McCollom, 81 Conn. 283, 70 Atl. 1035 (1908).
32. McKillip v. Gray's Harbor Publishing Company, 100 Wash. 657, 171 Pac. 1026 (1918);
Foley v. Press Publishing Company, 226 App. Div. 535, 235 N.Y. Supp. 340 (1st Dept.1929).
33. Tones v. Express Publishing Company, 87 Cal. App. 246, 262 Pac. 78 (1927);
Moynahan v. Waterbury Republican, 92 Conn. 331, 102 Atd. 653 (1918).
34. Noel, supra, note 26.
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sertions of fact that may fairly be said to be comment. It may be true that
some courts have limited the liberal view to cases involving political figures
35
or otherwise made a special case out of it. The correct position should be as
stated in Coleman v. MacLennan: "the correct rule, whatever it is, must gov-
ern in cases other than those involving candidates for office .... " as
Further confusion may:arise when the requirements of fair comment are
said to include a comment on facts truly stated.37 It is well recognized
that there is a privilege to report (as opposed to comment) on facts of public
interest.38 Where that privilege exists, it would not seem important whether
the facts, which are reported as a basis of the comment, were true or not.
But if the facts which must be true are those alleged by the defense to be
recitals of opinion, it is crucial to determine if the defense is one of privilege
or the absence of libel, since these incorrect facts could not be justified on
the basis of any other independent privilege.Thus, under the majority position, it is possible to report that a person
has stolen goods on many occasions and yet it would seem logically im-
possible to say that he is. a thief, since this assertion would be one of fact
concerning his personal character. No court has gone this far and truth
would be a very elusive, if possible, defense to such an action.
39 It would
be very difficult in most cases to move from the particular statement to a
general conclusion without subjecting the publisher to civil liability. Thus
it is our contention that the question is one of social policy for or against
the consequences of privilege.
The traditional argument that fair comment is not a privilege revolves
around the fact that it is not confined to a specific defendant or class of de-
fendants.4o This notion has been disposed of earlier. It has also been argued
that the defense is not one of privilege because malice alone will defeat a
plea of privilege, while fair comment may fail on other grounds, such as
comment on a matter of public concern. 41 But this is the same question
that arises in any matter of privilege: namely, was the statement within the
scope of the privilege?
CASE AND CONFLICT
It seems that the solution lies in less academic reasons and that the in-
telligent thing to do would be to examine the leading cases setting forth
both rules to determine which is the more desirable. The leading case setting
forth the reason for the traditional view is Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam.
42
In this case, Judge Taft argued that to extend the protection of privilege would
discourage good men from seeking political office and result in irresponsible
journalism. He reasoned that the existence and extent of privilege in a com-
munication are determined by balancing the needs and good of society
against the right of an individual to enjoy a good reputation when he had
done nothing to injure it. The privilege should always cease where the sacri-
35. Bailey v. Charleston' Mail Association. 126 W. Va. 292, 303, 27 S.E. 2d 837 (1943).
36. Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1906); Cobb v. Oklahoma Pub-
lishing Company, 42 Okla. 314, 140 Pac. 1079 (1914).
37. Walker & Son Ltd. v. Hodgson, (1909) 1 K.B. 239.
38. Irwin v. Ashurst, 158 Or. 61, 74 P. 2d 1127 (1938).
39. Most courts are satisfied that the defendant has proven the truth of the "gist" or sting
of the statement. Bell Publishing Company v. Garrett Eng. Co., Tex. Clv. App., 154
S.W. 2d 885 (1941): McGuire v. Vaughan, 196 Mich. 280, 64 N.W. 44 (1895).
40. Campbell v. Spottiswoode, supra, note 30.
41. Salmond, Torts (12th ed. 1957) p. 376.
42. Post Publishing Company v. Hallam, 59 Fed. 53 (1893).
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ice of the individual right becomes so great that it outweighs the public good
to be derived from the exercise of the privilege. The distinction is drawn
between comment or criticism and allegations of fact. It is one thing to com-
ment upon or criticize, even with severity, and quite another to assert that
a person has been guilty of particular misconduct.
The contrary view is expressed by Coleman v. MacLennan,
4 3 where it was
said that the Hallam decision and the traditional view were based on specu-
lation and fear of imagined results, and that those fears had been realized in
jurisdictions where the traditional view was not followed. It was pointed
out that freedom of expression was a new experience and it could not be
said that we were any worse off because of it. In a long and well con-
sidered decision, the court analyzed all the historical and social reasons for
sustaining the defense as one which should be protected by the incidents of
privilege. After pointing out the arguments for liberty of the press which
are all too familiar to most of us, the court concluded that any prospective
mischief that might be done by its decision would be more than offset by the
public good obtained. Here then are the more realistic reasons for the two
positions: whether the defense is to be considered one of justification or denial
depends on which reasons the court finds the most convincing.
BALANCING THE INTERESTS
The present California position is that the defense of fair comment is
one of privilege. The leading case reversing the view that the defendant
had to prove the truth of any statement of fact therein is Snively v. Record
Publishing Co. 4 4 This case involved an appointed public official and held
that a newspaper article concerning such a figure was privileged within the
meaning of the California Civil Code sec. 47 (3), as a communication with-
out malice to a person interested therein, by one who stands in such re-
lation to the person -interested as to afford reasonable ground for supposing
the motive for the communication innocent. It is not readily apparent why
a newspaper should stand in such relation to its readers or merit such a
generous inference. The reasons advanced by the court sustained the notion
that the privilege is based on social desirability of the consequences that
flow from the nature of a privilege. The court experienced no difficulty with
the fact that the privilege is in no way different from that of any citizen of the
community. 4 5 In citing Coleman v. MacLennan, the court stated that it felt
the prevailing and better opinion was in accord with that decision.
46 It is
worth noting that the Snively case and later cases concerned statements
about the •motive and personal character of the plaintiff 47 but by staying
with the basic concepts of privilege, the court did not feel called upon to
discuss whether such statements were ones of fact or of opinion. 48
The statement in Coleman u. MacLennan that a person may in good faith
publish whatever he honestly believes to be the truth, was considered too
broad. Courts have since pointed out that the holding that a statement is
privileged is not an invitation to commit any libel the publisher desires.
While one may on a privileged occasion and without malice publish
to interested persons what may be false, if he honestly believes it to
43. Coleman v. MacLennan. supra. note 36.
44. Snively v. Record Pb!.ishing Company, supra, note 1.
45. Id at 571.
45. Id. at 571.
46. Ibid.
47. Maher v. Devlin. 203 Cal. 270, 263 P. 812 (1928).
48. Glenn v. Gibson. 75 Cal. App. 2d 649, 171 P. 2d 118 (1946).
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be true, he is not by this rule given a license to overdraw, exaggerate
or to color the facts. 49
With respect to the presumption of malice, it is clear from both cases5 O
and statutes5 ' that no such presumption is available in California.
It may still be questioned whether or not this doctrine will extend to
comment other than upon political affairs and persons but the general nature
of privilege would indicate that the answer is in the affirmative. In the case
of criticism of a book or play, however, it is hard to see how the defendant
could reasonably believe the truth of any false assertion of fact on which
his comment would be based. The present California view has been extended
to a semi-public figure outside the realm of politics. 52 The prospects are that
California will retain its consistency and treat the defense of fair comment
as a defense of privilege.
The end result is actually a balancing of interests. Without a high de-
gree of freedom of the press as a vital source of public information there
tan be no well informed public. If a publisher is to be held responsible in
damages for every scrap of information pertaining to matters of public
interest, he will undoubtedly be throttled in his effort to disseminate pertinent
material within that area of the community affected. 5 3 It is necessary that
the press be guarded against all acts of the government, even court action,
and that there be the free discussion of matters of general interest and concern
which is so vital to the concept of rule by the governed.5 4
49. Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal. 2d 791, 799, 197 P. 2d 713 (1948).
50. Emde v. San Joaquin County Central Labor Council, 23 Cal. 2d 146, 161 (1943).
51. Cal. Civ. Code § 48. "'In the cases provided for in subsection (3) of the preceding
section (defining privilege), malice is not inferred from the communication."
52. Heuer v. Kee (teacher), 15 Cal. App. 2d 710, 59 P. 2d 1063 (1936); Maidman v. Jewish
Publications Inc. (lawyer), 54 Cal. 2d 643, 355 P. 2d 265 (1960).
53. Friedell v. Blakely Printing Co., 163 Minn. 226. 203 N.W. 974 (1952).
54. Hall, Preserving Liberty of the Press by the Defense of Privilege in Libel Actions, 26
Cal. L. Rev. 226 (1938).
